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HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK MAGAZINE

CAPTURING THE HUMAN FACTOR

By Mike Everley

"We seem to have passed the era where the need

was for further engineering safeguards in particularly

hazardous industries. What we now need is to

capture the human factor"

John Rimington - ex Director General HSE

 

Background

Safety, in recent years, has focused on physical and engineering controls and upon safe working procedures. It’s hardly surprising therefore that, after designing safe equipment and devising safe systems of work, the focus should now be turned onto that other variable- the human being. Greater improvement in safety performances may rest upon a greater understanding of employees and their attitudes and behaviour in the workplace.

Understanding employee behaviour is also a central requirement in a self-regulatory system, where the controls and influences are more likely to come from within the organisation than from external bodies such as the Health and Safety Executive. Although external bodies such as insurance companies can exert considerable financial pressure on self-regulatory organisations to develop a human factors approach to health and safety. Such an approach can include the screening-out of employees who present an above-average risk. Furthermore, there has been a perceivable shift towards greater individual responsibility for the health and safety of ourselves and others.

Safety Practitioners have often relied upon the safe place – safe person strategy to direct their thinking and such a strategy often underpins both risk assessment techniques and accident causation models as the following diagram illustrates.

The term "human factors" is often used to cover a range of issues. These include the perceptual, mental and physical capabilities of people and the interactions of individuals with their jobs and working environments, the influence of equipment and systems design on human performance and, above all, the organisational characteristics which influence safety-related behaviour at work. This safety-related behaviour forms the base of the accident triangle (whichever variant of the triangle is used).

Put simply, there is a ratio between the near misses at the base of the accident triangle and the major injuries at the top (the exact ratio varying according to the variant of the technique adopted). It is often only luck which determines which incident will be a near miss and which will be more serious. However, it is the behaviour patterns of the individuals involved which give rise to both the near misses and the more serious accidents. Therefore, near misses are also preventative opportunities for the Safety Practitioner as they indicated which behaviour patterns need to be changed before luck runs out and a serious accident occurs.

However, it is important not to jump to the conclusion that incorrect behaviour patterns on behalf of individual employees equates directly with fault. Often the behaviour patterns are a result of organisational failures or pressures to which individual employees are merely responding. Organisations wishing to correct inappropriate behaviour patterns need to consider every rule and procedures, in all operational and emergency situations, and to replace those which cannot be followed with new rules and procedures that can be followed. Employees will then need to be trained in the new rules and procedures and monitoring systems will need to be introduced in order to ensure that they are, in fact, being followed. This approach requires a fairly heavy resource commitment on behalf of the organisation.

It is within this context that the Health and Safety Executive’s publication Reducing Error and Influencing Behaviour (HSG48) needs to be considered.

HSG48

Reducing Error and Influencing Behaviour is in fact a substantial revision of the previous publication Human Factors in Industrial Safety and it is good to note that the Health and Safety Executive have noted the perceptual failings with regard to the previous publication – notably the fact that the term industrial limited the scope of the audience despite the fact that human factors apply to all workplaces (this misperception was reinforced by the use of a heavy industrial scene on the front cover and the selection of examples mainly relating to heavy industry). The new publication is clearly directed at all workplaces and all work activities (as the front cover, title and selected examples clearly reinforce).

According to Reducing Error and Influencing Behaviour: "Human factors refer to environmental, organisational and job factors, and human and individual characteristics which influence behaviour at work in a way which can affect health and safety". In other words the three crucial elements of job, individual and organisation need to be carefully considered.

Element

Detail

Job Factors

Requires tasks to be designed in a way that takes into account ergonomic principles and recognises strengths and limitations in human performance. Matching the job to the person requires consideration of both a physical and a mental match. It is the mismatch between job requirements and individual capabilities that provides the opportunity for human error. Hence the need to match the employee’s capabilities to the task they are being asked to perform as required by the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999.

Individual Factors

Individual characteristics such as personal attitudes, skills, habits and personalities can be strengths or weaknesses depending upon task demands. Certain individual characteristics, such as personality, are fixed, whereas other characteristics, such as skills and attitudes can be modified or enhanced.

Organisational Factors

Organisational factors have the greatest influence upon individual and group behaviour. The organisational culture, for example, needs to promote employee involvement and commitment at all levels and emphasis that deviation from established health and safety standards is not acceptable.

In order to begin to develop a fully-fledged human factors strategy, the above factors should be considered during risk assessment, accident investigation, design and procurement as well as in day-to-day operations.

The key objective of the publication is to move away from the mistaken notion that accidents and incidents are the result of human error by the worker in the front line. "Attributing incidents to human error has often been seen as a sufficient explanation in itself and something which is beyond the control of managers. This view is no longer acceptable to society as a whole. Organisations must recognise that they need to consider human factors as a distinct element which must be recognised, assessed and managed effectively in order to control risks".

With regard to the three main factors, the following causes are often related to human failures in accidents:

Job Factors

Individual Factors

Organisational Factors

If the above are common causes of human failures, the failures themselves can be categorised into various types involving errors and violations. The following diagram illustrates this point:

The above model operates with the notion that all human failures can be categorises as either human error or violations depending on whether or not intention was involved with the failure. A human error being an action or decision which was not intended, but which involved a deviation from an accepted standard and which led to an undesirable outcome. Errors can be sub-divided into slips, lapses and mistakes.

Slip

Lapse

Mistakes

Failures in carrying out the actions of a task. In other words "actions not as planned". These might include: Performing an action too soon or too late, Omitting a step or series of steps from a task, Carrying out an action with too little or too much strength, Performing the action in the wrong direction, Doing the right thing but with regard to the wrong object, Carrying out the wrong check but on the right object.

Forgetting to carry out an action, to lose our place in a task or to forget what we had intended to do. Often linked to interruptions and distractions. A simple checklist to follow can help to reduce the likelihood of lapses occurring.

Where we do the wrong thing believing it to be right. The failure involves our mental processes which control how we plan, assess information, make intentions and judge consequences. Rule-Based Mistakes occur when our behaviour is based upon remembered rules or procedures. Knowledge-Based Mistakes are often related to incomplete information being available.

Errors are more likely to occur where there are: Work environment stressors, Extreme task demands, Social and organisational stressors, Individual stressors, Equipment stressors. Risk assessments should therefore identify where such factors are present and assess the likelihood of errors taking place and their consequences. Error control and reduction should take into account the need: To address the conditions and to reduce the stressors, To design plant and equipment in order to either prevent slips or lapses occurring or to increase the chances of detecting and correcting such errors, To ensure that arrangements for training are effective, To design jobs to avoid the need for tasks which involve complex decisions, diagnoses or calculations, To provide proper supervision, To check that job aids such as procedures are clear, concise, available, up-to-date and accepted, To monitor that the measures taken to reduce error are effective.

Whereas, a violation is a deliberate deviation from a rule or procedure. Most violations are motivated by a desire to carry out the job despite prevailing constraints and very rarely are they motivated by wilful acts of sabotage or vandalism. Violations can be sub-divided into routine, situational and exceptional.

Routine

Situational

Exceptional

Breaking rules or procedures has become a normal way of working within the work group due to: The desire to cut corners, The perception that the rules are too restrictive, The belief that the rules no longer apply, Lack of enforcement of the rules, New workers not realising that routine violations are taking place. Means of reducing such violations can include: Routine monitoring, Removal of unnecessary rules, Ensuring rules are relevant and practical, Explaining the reasons for the rules, Improved design to reduce the likelihood of cutting corners, Involvement of the workforce in drawing-up the rules.

Breaking the rules is due to pressures from the job, such as: Time pressure, Insufficient staff for the workload, The right equipment not being available, Extreme weather conditions. Risk assessments should help identify the potential for such violations as will good two-way communications.

These rarely happen and only when something has gone wrong. To solve a problem employees believe that a rule has to be broken. It is falsely believed that the benefits outweigh the risks. Means of reducing such violations could include: Training for dealing with abnormal situations, Risk assessments to take into account such violations, Reduction of time pressures on staff to act quickly in novel situations.

Developing a Strategy

HSG48 provides a powerful model showing the type of human errors and violations that can be predicted from consideration of organisational, job and individual factors. Such a model can be used both in risk assessments and accident investigations in order to suggest the control measures required to prevent either an occurrence or a re-occurrence. The HSE Contract Research Report 175/1998 Individual differences in accident liability: A review provides an integrated model of accident liability which can be utilised in relation to the model provided by HSG48.

According to the Contract Research Report: " In terms of personality, the evidence presented in this review suggests that extroversion and neuroticism are linked to increased accident vulnerability, but does not suggest why this should be so. It is plausible that while neuroticism may be associated with accidents via an increased vulnerability to stress, extroversion may increase an individual’s willingness to take risks. The model of accident liability attempts to integrate the findings of research into individual differences in accident liability with more recent research into the various forms of human failure and their role in accident causation. The model offered also attempts to link psychological, organisational and behavioural factors together in the accident-producing nexus".

Job analysis is a useful technique allowing for the identification of important behavioural and performance qualities and for the matching of individuals to jobs. However, it should always be remembered that the personality characteristics that give rise to safe performance in one situation may prove detrimental in another situation. For example; a rigid approach to rules and procedures may be required in most instances, but a more flexible approach be required in an emergency situation. Such factors need to be considered when risk assessments are performed in relation to normal operations and emergencies.

Where the safety culture is clear and positive, group pressure can even influence an unstable extrovert not to take risks. However; where the culture is ambivalent, and linked to performance targets and deadlines, the message may become that short-cuts are acceptable in order to achieve targets.

HSG48 provides the following useful checklist of questions which organisations can adopt when developing a strategy based upon the control of organisational, job and individual factors which can lead to human failings:

The Job

Have you:

The Individual

Have you:

The Organisation

Do you have:

References

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